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Geographies of Brexit and its Aftermath: Voting in England at the 2016 
Referendum and the 2017 General Election 
 
Abstract. Much has been written since the 2016 Brexit referendum regarding the divides 
within British society that the vote illustrated – including geographical divides – and their 
influence on the outcome of the 2017 general election. Focusing on England, this paper 
explores the extent and significance of those geographical divides at the 2016 referendum, 
at a variety of spatial scales – concluding that apart from a major difference between parts 
of inner London and the rest of England these were largely insignificant. Turning to the 
2017 general election, analyses show that this return to a predominantly two-party system 
within England largely involved a replication of the geography of the 2015 general election 
outcome. A new electoral map of England did not emerge from the divisions that Brexit 
stimulated: the country is divided along class lines, with London standing out as different 
from all other regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For British citizens who did not live there, London came to have a “foreign” aspect, 
deepening their sense that the metropolitan “elite” residing in the capital was somehow 
alienated from the rest of the country (Applebaum, 2017, 56). 
 
Of the fifty local jurisdictions where the vote to remain in the EU was strongest, only eleven 
were not in London or Scotland, and most of these were areas with large universities. In a 
country divided on unfamiliar lines, London – home to the political, business and media elite 
– was profoundly at odds with the country that it dominates and overshadows. London 
wholeheartedly embraced Europe, even as most of England emphatically rejected it. The 
same story played out in microcosm across the nation. Diverse urban areas and university 
towns returned large Remain majorities, but found themselves swimming against the tide, 
as the bulk of English local jurisdictions backed Leave (Ford and Goodwin, 2017, 25).  
 
In terms of what the EU referendum has revealed, the UK is clearly fragmented with notable 
differences between people and places. There is some truth in a regional reading of the 
referendum results whereby London … stands apart from parts of the East Midlands, West 
Midlands, the East, and Yorkshire and The Humber in terms of its (decreased) support for 
Leave. However, the splits are not as simple as sometimes they have been portrayed: there 
is variation within regions, with notable differences between large cities and towns … and 
smaller towns and rural regions (Harris and Charlton, 2016, 2126) 
 
 
Much was written in the aftermath regarding the social and economic divides exposed by the result 
of the UK’s 2016 referendum on whether to leave the European Union. Two major cleavages were 
identified (by, for example, Ashcroft, 2017; Curtice, 2017a, 2017b; Surridge, 2017 – but also 
Bhambra, 2017): between those with no or few education qualifications and those with extensive 
qualifications (though see Antonucci et al.’s – 2017a – modification of this); and between the young 
and the old. These interacted: old people with few qualifications were more likely to vote Leave than 
their younger contemporaries in similar situations. Additionally, the different groups tend to live in 
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separate parts of the country – in different regions (London has many more well-educated 
cosmopolitans than other regions, for example) and different types of place (university cities have 
more cosmopolitans than declining mining and industrial towns). The nation was also divided 
geographically, therefore. But was there more to that geography than a simple reflection of that 
socio-economic divide? Goodwin and Heath (2016a) identified ‘a significant “interaction effect” 
between a person’s level of education and the educational profile of the area where they live. … 
Graduates who live in low-skilled communities were more likely to vote for Brexit, and more similar 
to those with low education, than graduates who live in high-skilled communities’. The result was a 
country ‘deeply divided along not only social but also geographical lines’. Indeed, Ivlevs and Veliziotis 
(2017) showed that in areas with high levels of immigration from EU sources, whereas older, low-
income and unemployed residents expressed a decline in their life satisfaction levels, younger, 
better-qualified and higher-income residents of the same areas reported an increase. 
 
Few analyses have explored those geographical lines in detail (though see Harris and Charlton, 2016; 
Beecham et al., 2017); most simply examined differences across the UK’s major regions and London, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland stood out as the only ones returning majority support for Remain. 
Both Scotland and Northern Ireland have distinctive political cultures that were highly significant in 
determining the outcome (on Scotland, see Gallagher, 2017). Were there any other clear 
geographical elements to the pattern of voting at the referendum? Although overall the outcome 
nationally was very close, with 51.9 per cent voting for Leave and 48.1 per cent for Remain, there 
was very considerable variation in the degree of support across England. Among the 326 local 
authorities for which the results were reported, the percentage voting for Leave varied from 21.4 to 
75.6 with a mean of 54.5 and a standard deviation of 10.0. The gap between voting Leave or Remain 
was 40 percentage points or more in favour of Leave in nine authorities and there were eleven 
where the gap was 40 points or more in favour of Remain.
1
 At the finer ward scale, among those for 
which data were available (see below) the percentage voting Leave varied from 12.2 to 82.5 with a 
mean of 52.2 and a standard deviation of 14.5; there were twenty-six where the percentage 
supporting Leave exceeded that supporting Remain by more than 50 points and seventy-one where 
support for Remain was at least 50 points larger than support for Leave. Despite the overall 
closeness of the outcome, therefore, there were very substantial geographical differences  within 
England which need to be explored.
2
 The only detailed analysis addressing this is by Beecham et al. 
(2016): this shows that although the main determinants of the level of voting Brexit across all local 
authorities – qualifications and professional employment – had a similar impact in each region, other 
variables, which had much less impact overall, varied regionally in the strength of their relationships 
with voting differences; there were local as well as national geographies. 
 
Geographical studies of voting patterns distinguish between what are generally termed 
compositional and contextual effects (the terminology is from Thrift, 1983). Most people’s voting 
decisions are taken to promote their self-interests, supporting the party, candidate or referendum 
issue that best represents their attitudes. These are compositional effects and if they dominate 
decision-making then the geography of an electoral outcome should reflect the geography of the 
social groups – such as social classes – sharing particular attitudes. But it may be that, usually in 
addition to these effects, people in certain places are more likely to vote for one outcome rather 
than another, reflecting local influences: these are contextual effects. Most studies of British voting 
                                                            
1
 The authorities giving the largest support for Leave included seven in eastern England (Boston; South 
Holland; Castle Point; Thurrock; Great Yarmouth; Fenland; and East Lindsey); the other two were in the East 
Midlands – Bolsover and Mansfield. Of the eleven giving the largest support for Remain all but Oxford were 
London boroughs. 
2
 Wales differs less in its political culture – or at least in many parts of the country – from England than do 
Scotland and Northern Ireland but it also has a devolution settlement through which some at least of its 
separate political concerns can be pursued and so has been excluded from the analyses here. 
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patterns – from the classic work of Butler and Stokes (1969) on and including analyses of the Brexit 
referendum, as discussed below – stress the compositional effects, in which case the only 
geographical concern is why the relevant groups are clustered in some places and not others. If, in 
addition, there are geographical variations not accounted for by the compositional effects, then 
geographical context itself may be a relevant concern (as Butler and Stokes illustrated). This paper 
explores whether that was so in England in 2016. 
 
Because the social and economic divides exposed by the referendum were considered to be 
different from those underpinning voting at previous UK general elections (Jones et al., 2016), 
questions were raised whether those cleavages – and associated geographical divisions – would 
recur at future general elections: had the country’s electoral geography been permanently 
disrupted? A snap general election a year after the referendum provides an opportunity to address 
that question. The first part of this paper therefore explores the geography of voting at the 
referendum across England in greater geographical detail than heretofore; the second part explores 
whether the referendum vote had any influence on Britain’s changing electoral geography between 
the 2015 and 2017 General Elections. 
 
Changing electoral geographies 
 
The first three post-1945 decades saw very considerable stability in the British party system and 
electoral geography. Two parties – Conservative and Labour – predominated, with a geography 
represented as a north-south divide (Johnston et al., 1988). From 1974 on, however, that party 
system and the associated electoral geography were both fractured. The two parties remained 
dominant but were no longer hegemonic; they still captured the great majority of seats and the 
north-south divide remained. But a third party – which eventually became the Liberal Democrats – 
captured up to one-quarter of the votes at some elections and became the main contestant to either 
the Conservatives or, increasingly, Labour in a substantial number of seats.  
 
That electoral geography of three two-party systems in England and two four-party systems in 
Scotland and Wales (Johnston and Pattie, 2011), persisted until the 2010 general election, after 
which new patterns emerged (Johnston et al., 2016). There was growing support for the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which campaigned for the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union. That policy resonated with an increasing proportion of the electorate, and UKIP emerged as 
the largest party in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, with 26.6 per cent of the votes. 
Support for the Conservative and Labour parties remained largely unchanged in England at the 2015 
election, both in their shares of the votes and their electoral geographies,
3
 but the Liberal 
Democrats’ vote share fell by more than two-thirds. They were no longer a viable contestant in 
many constituencies and UKIP now occupied second place in a considerable number of seats – 
though it won only one. 
 
UKIP’s pressure, alongside a substantial group on the right of his party, stimulated the Conservative 
leader, David Cameron, to a 2015 election manifesto commitment to hold an in-out referendum on 
the UK’s membership of the EU, after negotiations to seek modifications to its terms. After he won 
an unexpected small majority of MPs, the referendum was held on 23 June 2016 with a small 
majority voting to Leave (what became known as Brexit). Cameron resigned and a new Conservative 
majority government undertook to oversee the Brexit process. After a year in power, Prime Minister 
Theresa May called a snap general election seeking an enhanced House of Commons majority to 
                                                            
3
 The correlation (r
2
) between their vote percentages across the 632 seats in Great Britain between the two 
general elections was 0.93 for the Conservatives. For Labour it was considerably smaller at 0.77, largely 
reflecting the SNP’s Scottish success, which was largely at Labour’s cost – for England and Wales alone, the r
2
 
value was also 0.93. 
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conduct the exit negotiations. That failed; the Conservatives remained the largest party but not only 
lost seats to Labour but also lost their overall House of Commons majority. UKIP’s support collapsed 
– in part because it fielded no candidate in over 20 per cent of constituencies – and the Liberal 
Democrats achieved no overall improvement in their vote share. The two-party dominant system 
was largely restored – except in Scotland (Johnston et al., 2017, 2018). 
 
The 2015 election, the 2016 referendum, and then the 2017 election saw considerable change in 
British politics, therefore. But were those changes represented in England’s electoral geography?  
 
People and place in voting for Brexit 
Electoral geographers have long explored whether mapped patterns of support for a political party, 
candidate, or referendum issue are epiphenomenal – the observed geographical variations merely 
reflecting other geographies, such as those of the types of people who support particular political 
parties, policies and candidates (Agnew, 1990). If so, then the electoral geographies are 
compositional and not independent of other, underlying patterns; if not, then there are spatially 
specific contextual influences on electoral behaviour. 
 
Compositional and contextual factors underlie the geography of the Brexit vote. Support for leaving 
the European Union from the 1990s on was initially concentrated within the Conservative party. The 
core of their case focused on the loss of sovereignty ‘to Brussels’, often linked to arguments that EU 
membership was an economic burden rather than an advantage, that the UK would be more 
prosperous operating its own trade policy and unconstrained by EU labour market and other 
regulations. From the mid-2000s on, these were joined by UKIP whose goal was ensuring the UK left 
the European Union (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015): increasingly its focus within that pursuit was on 
immigration, especially after the accession to the EU of eastern European states and the British 
Labour government deciding to impose no transitional restrictions on their nationals’ freedom of 
movement (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). UKIP’s spokespersons made much of the large number of 
immigrants who moved to the UK, not only – according to its arguments – depressing wages in many 
occupations, especially those relatively poorly paid in many service industries, and making it harder 
for locals to obtain jobs, but also putting pressure on local housing markets, schools, health and 
other public services. These arguments resonated increasingly with groups that had traditionally 
voted Labour – a situation exacerbated as the economic recession hit them hardest – and who were 
becoming increasingly discontented with not only particular political parties but also with 
governments – and the ‘Westminster elite’ more generally – for their failure to deliver policies that 
benefited those increasingly disadvantaged (Jennings et al., 2017; Deeming and Johnston, 2018).  
 
A new class divide opened, therefore, with in particular older people (especially men) with few 
educational qualifications supporting UKIP (Johnston et al., 2018b). They had ‘lost out’ from the free 
market internationalism policies pursued by successive governments and felt that the welfare state 
– and particularly the Labour party which had established it – was no longer meeting their needs 
(Richards, 2017). At the 2014 European parliament elections, therefore, as well as at parliamentary 
by-elections and local government elections, UKIP won support across a wide range of 
constituencies, apparently fracturing the established party system and its electoral geography (as 
former Labour voters switched their allegiance, for example). That was largely compositional – the 
places where UKIP was performing well were those where the relatively disadvantaged (the ‘left-
behinds’ in some analyses – Mckenzie, 2017; though see Antonucci et al., 2017b; the ‘somewheres’ 
against the metropolitan ‘nowheres’ in another – Goodhart, 2017) were concentrated. But there 
were contextual effects too: UKIP had concentrations of support where it won seats at local 
government elections, in places where the local economy was substantially impacted by large-scale 
recent immigration, such as the horticultural areas of south Lincolnshire and parts of East Anglia. 
 
Page 4 of 34
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cspp
Space and Polity
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 O
nly
5 
 
But were there more extensive geographical variations? Many analyses of British voting patterns – at 
ecological and individual scales – merely explore such potential geographies by using the standard 
division of England into nine regions. In early studies of voting for Brexit across Britain’s 380 local 
government areas (in which the votes were counted and reported), Goodwin and Heath (2016b) 
found that, holding compositional effects constant (as discussed in more detail below), support for 
Brexit was lower in London and Scotland than elsewhere: Clarke et al. (2017a) merely contrasted 
Scotland and Wales with England;
4
 Clarke and Whittaker (2016) found that, holding other variables 
constant, support for Leave was significantly lower in some regions than others within Great Britain; 
Lee et al. (2018) included regional controls but did not report their size or significance; and Gordon 
(2017) contrasted Merseyside, Wales and Scotland with the resat of Great Britain (see also Becker et 
al., 2017; Fielding, 2018). 
 
Such deployment of regions as the sole spatial variables adopts a scale both coarse-grained and ill-
suited to many such analyses. England’s nine regions are large (some have three times the 
population of others) and internally substantially heterogeneous. Except for London, all have 
substantial rural tracts alongside major urban centres; most contain a wide variety of urban 
settlements with different histories, contemporary functions and population characteristics. A finer-
grained territorial division of the country might be more likely to find significant contextual alongside 
compositional effects, therefore. Furthermore, rather than dividing the country into blocks of 
contiguous areas, however fine-grained in scale, it might be more revealing to group places 
according to their socio-economic and -demographic characteristics: places, it could be argued, 
differ because of their individual characteristics rather than their macro-location – there are no 
substantial political cultural variations across England’s regions. The next section explores whether 
that is the case in the pattern of voting for Brexit in the 2016 referendum. 
 
The geography of voting for Brexit in England: what geography? 
 
Research on who voted to leave the EU has shown that greatest support came from older people 
and those with few educational qualifications (Curtice, 2017a; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Zhang, 
2017): younger people, especially those in in the more cosmopolitan centres (London, the large 
cities at the core of the main conurbations, and a number of other towns and cities, especially those 
with large universities), were more likely to vote to remain within the EU. To evaluate that case 
further, relevant census variables were deployed in two sets of analyses, one across all English local 
authorities, and the other for a non-random selection of wards within those authorities for which 
the voting data were released. 
 
The local authority scale 
 
Seven variables indicating the relative presence of different groups known either to differ in their 
attitudes to Brexit or impact upon others’ attitudes were obtained from census tabulations for each 
English local authority. Because of inter-correlations among those variables – with the potential for 
confounding effects in the regression analyses (Johnston et al. 2018a) – they were reduced to three 
composite variables using principal components factor analysis. Three factors accounting for 84 per 
cent of the variation in the predictor variables were extracted, identifying, after a direct oblimin 
                                                            
4
 Elsewhere, Clarke et al. (2017b) found no clear significant relationships between voting Leave and several 
socio-demographic factors, but this was because – as in many studies of British voting behaviour – they also 
included attitudinal variables that are related to those socio-demographic factors and confound the regression 
models (see Johnston et al., 2018b). Becker et al. (2017) included a wider range of variables than most other 
studies – though largely reaching the same general conclusions – but included no geographical variables. 
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rotation to simple structure,
5
 separate dimensions to the compositional differences across local 
authorities (Table 1): 
I. Cosmopolitan areas with relatively few old people
6
 – those with high positive scores; 
II. Relatively deprived areas – those with high positive scores; and  
III. Areas with large student populations – those with high negative scores. 
 
Regressing each local authority’s scores on those three factors against the percentage voting Leave 
(Model 1 in Table 2) shows support for Brexit was: less, the more cosmopolitan the area (i.e. the 
more Asian and Black self-identified ethnics in an area and the more immigrants from the countries 
that joined the EU after 2001) – the negative coefficient for Factor I; greater, the more deprived the 
area’s population (i.e. the more households identified as deprived on three or more criteria and the 
more adults with no educational qualifications) – the positive coefficient for Factor II; and less, the 
fewer students and more old people living there – the positive coefficient for Factor III (on which the 
percentage of students has a negative loading). All three are highly significant and account for 68 per 
cent of the variation in the Brexit vote; of the three the second is most influential statistically and 
the first is the least. 
  
Regional variations? 
 
Are there additional regional variations? The Model 2 regression in Table 2 adds dummy variables 
for eight regions, contrasting their support for Leave with that in London, holding constant the three 
compositional factors. All have positive and significant regression coefficients at the 0.05 level (each 
is more than 1.96 times its standard error, shown in brackets), suggesting that – population 
composition having been taken into account – on average local authorities in each of the other 
regions gave greater support to Brexit than did London’s.
7
 But using the conventional measure,
8
 
those eight regional coefficients do not differ significantly from each other, as illustrated by Figure 1 
which shows the coefficients for each region – ordered by their size, with their upper and lower 
bounds. All eight sets of bounds overlap and are clustered around the average coefficient of 8.0. 
Given the differences consequent on varying population characteristics, the rest of the country gave 
significantly greater support for Brexit than London, but there were no significant differences across 
those eight regions outside London. 
 
And there many analyses stop. But what if those are regions subdivided? The subdivision used here 
is based on one developed in the 1980s for The Economist (Johnston et al., 1988), which separates 
out the major conurbations from their surrounding hinterlands. There are seventeen subregions, 
and the regression contrasts sixteen of them with Inner London. The full results (not reproduced 
here) show a substantial improvement on Model 2, with an R
2
 of 0.81. But little additional 
geographical detail emerges from the subregional coefficients (Figure 2). Fifteen regions differ 
significantly from Inner London in their support for Brexit, the exception being Merseyside where 
average support for Brexit across its local authorities did not differ significantly from Inner 
                                                            
5
 An oblimin rotation does not – unlike Varimax rotations – unrealistically require that the factors remain 
uncorrelated; it gives a better approximation of simple structure (i.e. it maximises each variable’s loading on a 
single factor only) where the factor structures are correlated. 
6
 Fox and Pearce (2018) suggest there are generational as well as age effects in the pattern of Euroscepticism. 
7
 Note that the regression coefficient for Factor I is much smaller (and only marginally significant at 
conventional levels) in Model 2 than in Model 1, indicating collinearity with one or more of the regional 
variables – undoubtedly the concentration of cosmopolitan populations in Greater London. 
8
 The conventional measure is whether the upper and lower bounds for each coefficient (i.e. the coefficient +/- 
1.96 times its standard error) overlap. 
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London’s.
9
 But there were no significant differences among the other fifteen subregions apart from a 
very small one between Greater Manchester, the least pro-Brexit subregion after Inner London and 
Merseyside, and the Outer Metropolitan (Home Counties) subregion where local authorities on 
average were most supportive of the Leave campaign. (Note the substantial and significant – 14 
percentage points – difference between Inner and Outer London local authorities. The cosmopolitan 
influence was much weaker in London’s suburbs.) 
 
Places rather than regions 
 
Regions and subregions are far from homogeneous: similar places – post-industrial towns based on 
railway engine construction, for example – are found in several if not most regions. To focus on 
similar places wherever they are located, therefore, we use a hierarchical classification of English 
local authorities – twenty-six subgroups nested within thirteen groups nested within seven 
supergroups – produced by the Office of National Statistics using census data.
10
 (The full hierarchy is 
shown in the Appendix.) The question being addressed is the same: holding constant their 
population characteristics as identified by the three factors, did similar places according to this 
classification display significantly separate levels of support for Brexit? 
 
Model 3 in Table 2 reports a regression including the seven supergroups, in which the comparator is 
London Cosmopolitan (a group of twenty local authorities). Because population characteristics are 
used in the creation of the three factors as well as the supergroups, collinearity is possible. This was 
clearly the case with the first – cosmopolitan – factor, whose high scores were concentrated in the 
comparator supergroup; the regression coefficient for Factor 1 is small and statistically insignificant. 
But the coefficients for the other two factors and their standard errors are little different from those 
reported for Model 1. 
 
The regression coefficients for the six supergroups are large and statistically highly significant, 
indicating that each supergroup of places differed very substantially in its average level of support 
for Brexit from the London Cosmopolitan boroughs. But they are all very similar in magnitude – 
ranging between 13.1 and 15.8 – and their upper and lower bounds clearly overlap. At this coarse 
scale, therefore, much of London differed from the rest of the country in support for the Leave 
campaign, but there were no significant differences between those six other supergroups. 
 
A similar conclusion is reached from the analysis of the thirteen groups, in which the comparator is 
the twelve boroughs grouped together as London Cosmopolitan Central. The R
2
 value associated 
with the regression equation (not shown here) increases slightly to 0.78 but, as Figure 3 
demonstrates, although all had a significantly larger average level of support for Brexit than the 
comparator group again there was no significant difference across the twelve, except for a very 
slight one between the two extreme groups – London Cosmopolitan Suburbia and Growth Areas and 
Cities. Once again, Inner London differed from the rest of the country. 
 
A slightly more nuanced conclusion can be drawn from the final analysis, of the twenty-six 
subgroups, in which the comparator is the eight boroughs categorised as Cosmopolitan Inner 
London (the R
2
 value is 0.80). One other subgroup – Cosmopolitan Heart of London (four boroughs) 
doesn’t differ significantly from the comparator – but all others do, including both Cosmopolitan 
North and South London (five and three boroughs respectively). Again, most of the other subgroups’ 
                                                            
9
 This may reflect an Irish influence (Merseyside has close links with Ireland and a large population of Irish 
ancestry, and the Irish government strongly supported the UK remaining within the EU). 
10
 For details on the classification, see https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/geography/ 
geographicalproducts/areaclassifications/2011areaclassifications/methodologyandvariables (accessed 22 
August 2017). 
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upper and lower bounds overlap (Figure 4) so that although there is a clear progression of regression 
coefficients indicating ever-larger differences from the comparator group, up to an average of 22.1 
percentage points greater support for Brexit, only for the last two – the eighteen local authorities in 
the Expanding Areas and Established Cities subgroup and the eleven in that of Expanding Towns and 
Manufacturing Areas – is that difference significantly different from any of the other subgroups, and 
that only from one, Cosmopolitan South London. 
 
A final check for spatial patterns not identified by the regional and place classifications involved 
inspecting the largest residuals from the subregion and subgroup regressions: the largest fifteen 
over- and under-predictions (negative and positive unstandardised residuals respectively) are shown 
in Table 3. All but one of the fifteen largest over-predictions from the subregion analysis, places 
where support for Brexit was substantially lower than predicted, are in southern England (the 
exception is Knowsley, in Merseyside; the next furthest north is Leicester) but they have no other 
common element. Furthermore, although four of the largest under-predictions (the lower block in 
Table 3) are northern, again there is a preponderance in the south and, with a few small exceptions 
such as the naval centres of Plymouth, Portsmouth and Gosport, again there are no obvious major 
communalities. One clear feature of the largest overpredictions from the subgroup analysis is the 
presence of four of Merseyside’s local authorities – Liverpool, Knowsley, Sefton, and Wirral. 
Plymouth, Portsmouth and Gosport again all have large positive residuals, as do several authorities 
on either bank of the Thames estuary where UKIP won considerable support at recent contests – 
Medway, Dartford, Rochford, and Thurrock – as well as two outer east London boroughs – Bexley 
and Havering. What these residuals show, therefore, is that some places – a few of which were 
either spatially contiguous or shared common functions, patterns not picked up by the subregional 
and subgroup classifications – differed substantially from the overall pattern identified by the three 
factors representing socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics, but in general these 
were place-specific and not representing wide geographical variations in support for Brexit. 
  
Region and Place 
 
A final regression examined variations by both region and place, including both subregions and 
subgroups: the R
2
 was 0.84. Only one subregion coefficient was significantly different from the 
comparator; Merseyside’s average Brexit vote was significantly lower than Cosmopolitan Inner 
London’s. All but one of the subgroup coefficients was statistically significant, however, the 
exception being Cosmopolitan Heart of London. But none of the other twenty-four was significantly 
different from any other: apart from much of Inner London plus Merseyside, there were no 
significant variations in the level of support for leaving the EU across the rest of England – either by 
region, subregion, or type of place. There were substantial differences in some cases, but these were 
largely place/type-specific rather than applying widely across a particular type of place. 
 
The main residuals from this regression (Table 4) include many of the local authorities in Table 3. By 
including subregion as well as subgroup, however, the Merseyside cluster is removed – although the 
support for Brexit in Knowsley remains substantially over-predicted whereas it is substantially under-
predicted for neighbouring St Helens. 
 
In sum, therefore, these local authority scale analyses have identified a clear division between either 
London and the rest of England at a coarse, regional scale, or between Inner London, Merseyside 
and the rest of the country at the finer-grained subregional scale.
11
 Holding constant differences 
                                                            
11
 Note that in an early analysis of the results across Great Britain as a whole, Clarke (2016) claims to have 
identified no ‘London effect’ once seven socio-demographic variables were taken into account. S Clarke, Why 
did we vote to leave? What an analysis of place can tell us about Brexit. Resolution Foundation Blog, 15 July 
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between local authorities in their socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics, England 
was basically split between inner London and the rest of the country in attitudes to Brexit. 
Furthermore, when local authorities were categorised according to their economic functions and 
population characteristics again, apart from the separation of much of (cosmopolitan) inner London 
from the rest of the country, no particular type of place stood out as significantly different from the 
others in the percentage supporting Leave. In simple terms – and apart from parts of Merseyside – 
once population characteristics of local authorities were taken into account, England was divided on 
Brexit between its cosmopolitan core and the remainder of the country. 
 
The ward scale 
 
Local authorities vary considerably in their size, population and socio-demographic characteristics, 
and while they form a significant local context they are not commensurate in scale to the 
neighbourhoods within which many people socially interact. Some local authorities published the 
referendum voting data by ward, which are much closer in scale to those neighbourhoods; those 
data were collated and made available by Martin Rosenbaum at the BBC.
12
 They are used here to 
analyse voting in the sixty local authorities with available data for either all or the great majority of 
their wards. (In most cases they are for votes cast on the day; postal votes were counted separately 
and not allocated to wards.) 
 
Comparable ward census data wer  subjected to a principal-components factor analysis, which 
when rotated to simple structure identified three similar constructs to those for local authorities, 
accounting for 77 per cent of the variation (Table 1). Regressed against the percentage voting Leave 
the resulting equation (with standard errors in brackets) was: 
 
Leave% = 52.4 – 6.9 Factor I + 7.1 Factor II – 4.7 Factor III                       R2 = 0.59 
                  (0.3)   (0.3)                (0.3)                 (0.3) 
 
a very similar result to that for local authorities (Table 2) except for the somewhat smaller R2 value. 
(Note that the different sign for Factor III is because the percentage of students loaded negatively on 
that factor in the local authority but positively in the ward analysis.) 
 
Five further analyses included dummy variables for regions, subregions, supergroups, groups and 
subgroups respectively, with ward population characteristics held constant (recognising that the 
places for which data were available in no way represented the regions and groups within which 
they are placed); the details are not reported. The R
2
 values were: regions – 0.61; subregions – 0.71; 
supergroups – 0.65; groups – 0.70; and subgroups – 0.72. There were substantial geographical 
variations, both subregional and by type of place, therefore. But as with the local authority analyses 
those patterns emphasised differences between (parts of) Inner London and the rest of the country, 
with little or no significant variation across wards in the latter. In the subregional analysis, for 
example, Merseyside wards (one local authority only – Wirral) gave significantly higher mean 
support for Brexit than Inner London and significantly lower support than all other subregions, but 
there were no significant variations among the remaining subregions. Two Inner London subgroups 
plus Education Centres (only one local authority – Brighton & Hove) differed significantly from the 
others, but with no further significant differences among the latter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2016, available at http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/blog/why-did-we-vote-to-leave-what-an-
analysis-of-place-can-tell-us-about-brexit/ (accessed 24 August 2017). 
12
 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38762034 (accessed 22 August 2017) and the alternative 
analyses on the Stats Guy Blog (http://www.statsguy.co.uk/?s=brexit – accessed 13 October 2017).. 
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These ward analyses sustain the earlier conclusions, therefore, that once the main individual voter 
characteristics of places were taken into account there was little geographical variation in support 
for Brexit. Parts of Inner London and of Merseyside, and probably some university cities, stood out 
as giving less support to the Leave campaign than the rest of England, but that was all. The variables 
used accounted for around 70 per cent of the variation in the percentage voting Leave, with little 
apparent pattern to the residual variation. A final ward-level model including both subregions and 
subgroups accounted for 77 per cent of the variation. The unstandardised residuals were summed 
by local authority in two ways, to explore whether any individual places stood out from the norm. In 
the first, residuals were summed across all wards in each authority; those with a large positive 
average were where all population groups were apparently more likely to vote Leave than the norm, 
whereas those with a large negative average were those where all were less likely. The high-low 
graph (Figure 5) identifies only a few where there was an average variation of more than a few 
percentage points, either positive or negative; most had an average residual variation close to zero 
and none stood out as differing significantly from the other local authorities. The second summation 
was of absolute values (i.e. negative residuals transformed to positive): Figure 6 provides no 
evidence of local authorities differing significantly from the norm across its constituent wards – none 
has a mean exceeding ten percentage points. 
 
One year later: the geography of party support in 2017 
 
UKIP’s vote share collapsed from 12.6 per cent at the 2015 general election to 1.8 per cent in 2017 
and the Liberal Democrats failed to regain lost ground – they lost some seats and gained a few 
others but at 7.4 per cent their vote share was 0.5 points down. All polls predicted UKIP’s decline 
and the issue facing analysts was which party (if any) its former supporters would switch to. One 
argument was that many previous Labour supporters who voted UKIP in 2015 and/or for Leave at 
the 2016 referendum could vote Conservative in 2017, supporting the government delivering the 
‘hard Brexit’ that most Leave supporters wanted (see, for example, Ross and McTague, 2017; 
Shipman, 2017). If that happened, the electoral geography could change substantially. Achieving it 
was central to the Conservatives’ strategy: the Prime Minister launched her manifesto in a relatively 
marginal Labour-held seat (Halifax) and visited other such target seats during the campaign (Bale 
and Webb, 2017), in many of which UKIP decided not to field a candidate (Johnston et al., 2017). An 
alternative view was that, as Brexit was now happening, former Labour voters would return to that 
party, especially as it campaigned strongly on anti-austerity policies attractive to many of its 
erstwhile supporters whereas the Conservative manifesto included several commitments that would 
have a negative impact on many former Labour voters (Crines, 2017; Dorey, 2017). This might help 
Labour win in some Conservative-held marginals, especially where the incumbent MP had voted 
Remain but Leave gained a majority in 2016 – in many of which UKIP fielded a candidate again. (For 
analyses of voting at the referendum by constituency, we use the estimates generated by Hanretty: 
see Hanretty, 2017.) 
 
The pattern of voting Leave across English constituencies was unrelated to support for the two main 
political parties at the 2015 general election – Offe (2017) claimed that the two patterns were 
orthogonal. The R
2
 values are very small and the regression coefficients statistically insignificant 
(Table 5) but holding 2015 vote shares constant support for Brexit was significantly smaller in 
London than in the rest of England. There was a significant negative link between 2015 support for 
the Liberal Democrats (the only English party totally committed to a Remain vote) and the 
percentage who voted for Brexit plus an – unsurprisingly – strong positive relationship between it 
and UKIP’s 2015 performance. 
 
The geography of the referendum vote in 2016 differed from that for the two main parties in 2015, 
therefore, but did the substantial support for Brexit in many constituencies outside London where 
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Labour performed well in 2015 (Figure 7) influence its 2017 performance there, for example, or did 
its geography of support – and also the Conservatives’ and Liberal Democrats’ – return to the 
established patterns? Polling data prior to the contest suggested that a substantial number of 2015 
Labour voters would not switch to the Conservatives in 2017, however. YouGov’s extensive polling in 
the last week of the 2017 campaign found 28 per cent who reported voting Labour in 2015; of them, 
23 per cent voted Leave at the 2016 referendum, and of that group only 18 per cent (i.e. 4 per cent 
of those who voted Labour in 2015) intended voting Conservative in 2017 whereas 65 per cent 
reverted to an intention to support Labour (see also Ashcroft, 2017). 
 
Table 6 reports regressions of each party’s 2017 vote share. Model 1 regresses that against its 2015 
share, accounting for 95 per cent of the variation for Labour, 86 per cent for Conservatives and 82 
per cent for the Liberal Democrats – clear evidence that 2017’s electoral geography replicated that 
two years previously, especially for Labour.
13
 Further variables explored whether the geography of 
voting for UKIP in 2015 and the presence of a UKIP candidate in 2017 accounted for any of the 
residual variation, plus whether the pattern of voting in London differed significantly from that in 
2015. (Because of collinearity between UKIP’s 2015 vote and the percentage voting Leave, only one 
was included to avoid problems of confounding and mis-interpretation: Johnston et al., 2018a.)  
Labour’s vote decreased very slightly in 2017 relative to 2015 the larger UKIP’s share of the vote in 
2015, and it also fell, by 0.82 percentage points on average, in constituencies where UKIP fielded a 
candidate in 2017, but neither of these changes altered the R
2
 value, indicating that although 
statistically significant they were substantively of little importance.
14
 There was also no significant 
change in the average level of support for Labour across London’s constituencies compared to all 
others. 
 
The Conservative regressions show a significant benefit from the decline in UKIP support – an 
increase of 0.73 percentage points for every one-point increase in UKIP’s 2015 vote share according 
to Model 3 but it was 1.5 points lower on average where UKIP fielded a candidate in 2017 (see also 
Heath and Goodwin, 2017). These two variables accounted for a further eight percentage points in 
the R
2
 value, suggesting that much of the – relatively small – change in the geography of the 
Conservatives’ support between the two contests involved them picking up votes from former UKIP 
supporters (see Mellon et al., 2017).
15
 On average, too, the Conservatives’ vote share fell by several 
points across London’s constituencies, a change countered by the average growth in the Liberal 
Democrats’ vote share there. (The Liberal Democrats were strong in parts of London up to and 
including the 2010 election, but several seats were lost in 2015, some of which were regained in 
2017.) As with the other two parties, however, the predominant influence on the geography of 
voting Liberal Democrat in 2017 was the geography in 2015. 
 
The geography of voting for England’s two largest parties changed very little between 2015 and 
2017, therefore; any anticipated substantial geographical turbulence created by the geography of 
support for leaving the European Union in 2016 failed to materialise. This is clearly demonstrated by 
                                                            
13
 Such continuity is the norm for most recent elections in England: the r
2 
value for the correlation of the 
Conservatives vote shares in 2010 and 2015 was 0.914; for Labour it was 0.928. 
14
 Tests also found no interaction effect involving those two variables. 
15
 Some commentators suggested that those incumbent Conservative MPs who voted for Brexit at the 
referendum might be punished by Tory voters at the 2017 election in constituencies where a majority was for 
Remain, whereas MPs who voted for Remain might be punished in constituencies with a Leave majority, but 
tests found no evidence that this happened. See, for example, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/796060/ 
General-Election-2017-Remain-Leave-constituency-Brexit-News-ony-Blair-Referendum; S. Sandhu, ‘Every 
Remain constituency with a pro-Brexit MP’, https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/pro-brexit-mps-represent-
remain-constituencies/; and P. Lynch ‘Conservative divisions on Brexit: the general election and beyond’ 
http://ukandeu.ac.uk/conservative-divisions-on-brexit-the-general-election-and-beyond/ (accessed 13 
February 2018) 
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the two graphs in Figure 8, which show each party’s vote shares at the two elections with the 
diagonal line indicating where the constituencies would be placed if they had the same outcome at 
both contests; constituencies are also divided into whether there was majority support for Brexit or 
not. For Labour, virtually every constituency is substantially above the line, indicating a positive 
swing across the country with very few exceptions. There is some suggestion that where it 
performed well in 2015 (with more than 50 per cent of the votes) it tended to do even better in 
2017 in seats where there was no majority for Brexit than in those where there was, but this is not 
confirmed by statistical testing.
16
 Where its vote share was low in 2015, on the other hand, it 
increased more in seats with a Brexit majority than in those where there was a Remain majority. For 
the Conservatives, however, Figure 8 shows clearly that its vote share increased in nearly all 
constituencies where there was a majority for Brexit and fell in most of those where there was not. 
 
The collapse in support for UKIP and the lack of growth for the Liberal Democrats meant that the 
2017 general election largely returned England to a two-party situation similar to that preceding the 
various post-1970s party-system fragmentations. Both Conservatives and Labour increased their 
vote shares – from 41.0 to 45.4 per cent for the former and 31.6 to 41.9 per cent in the latter. As 
Figure 8 suggests, for the Conservatives much of this was because many more UKIP voters in 2015 
switched to them than to any other party. Labour’s substantial increase was largely due to its anti-
austerity policies both re-mobilising support among formerly disenchanted supporters in its 
traditional heartlands, where turnout was relatively high (Goodwin and Heath, 2017), and 
encouraging greater support than at many previous elections among younger voters:
17
 according to 
Curtice (2017c, 8), ‘Social class was clearly displaced by age as the predominant demographic 
division amongst voters’ (see also Ashcroft, 2017). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
… the vote for Brexit exposed and deepened a new set of cleavages that are largely cultural 
rather than economic (Ford and Goodwin, 2017, 29) 
 
The pattern of voting at the 2016 referendum brought to the surface a number of evolving cleavages 
within British society. One was between two – Northern Ireland and Scotland – of the three parts of 
the country with devolution settlements and the rest of the UK: they voted to remain within the EU 
(Scotland by 62:48; Northern Ireland by 56:44) whereas England and Wales both voted to leave. Two 
further cleavages were socio-demographic: by age (older people were more likely to vote Leave; 
younger people – especially students – to vote Remain: see Nouvellet, 2017), and by qualifications 
(the more qualifications the greater the likelihood of an individual voting Remain). Within England, 
these latter two cleavages meant that the geography of voting at the referendum was very different 
from that for the various political parties – especially the two largest, Conservative and Labour – at 
recent general elections. Many of those among the old and the less-qualified who supported Brexit 
had previously either voted Labour or, because of their disillusionment with Labour’s policies, had 
                                                            
16
 Note, too, that in reporting the results from the 2017 BBC/ITV News/Sky News (which was extremely 
successful in predicting the outcome) Curtice et al. (2017) observed that across the 144 sampled polling booths 
the Conservative benefited more than Labour from the decline in UKIP’s support in constituencies that 
delivered a majority form Brexit in 2016. 
17
 Labour’s success in particular places also reflected the intensity of its mobilisation activities there: Scott and 
Wills (2017) illustrate this for the period preceding the 2015 general election; the establishment of Momentum 
before the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party leader in 2015 and its subsequent local campaigning prior to the 
2017 election further illustrates this strategy (see http://www.peoplesmomentum.com/ - accessed 14 
September 2017). Countering some claims to the contrary, Prosser et al. (2018) have shown that there was no 
increase in turnout by young voters in 2017, only greater support for the Labour party among those who did 
vote. 
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abstained. But some 23 per cent of those who had voted for Labour at the 2015 general election 
supported Leave at the referendum (as did 58 per cent of those who voted Conservative), and 63 per 
cent of English constituencies which returned a Labour MP in 2015 delivered a majority for Brexit 
(although all but twelve Labour MPs voted for Remain). 
 
That new geography attracted considerable attention because in addition to those new social 
cleavages – whose geography accounted for just over two-thirds of the variation in the percentage 
voting Leave across England’s local authorities – a further spatial cleavage appeared. At the regional 
scale, this contrasted London with the rest of England: even when the capital’s concentrations of 
ethnic minority populations, of immigrants from countries that joined the EU after 2001, of highly-
educated individuals living in affluent households, and of students were taken into account, support 
for the UK leaving the EU was significantly lower than expected. Cosmopolitan London stood out 
from the rest of England, even when its population composition had been taken into account. But 
was the 2016 electoral geography more complex than a simple (inner) London vs the Rest of England 
divide? Apart from Merseyside, where support for Leave was also lower than predicted, once 
population composition had been taken into account there were no significant differences between 
all of the other subregions into which England was divided or the various type of place according to a 
classification of local authorities, except for a few small groups of similar places, such as the 
country’s major naval bases. Cosmopolitan Inner London gave significantly less support to the Leave 
campaign than any other parts of England than predicted by its population composition; and across 
the rest of England, population composition was the only significant set of factors that separated 
places according to their support for Brexit. 
 
Following that referendum outcome and the incumbent Conservative government’s decision to 
implement it, there was uncertainty as to whether those new cleavages would determine support at 
subsequent general elections. That was addressed in mid-2017 when an unexpected general election 
was called. The resulting geography of support for the two main parties very largely replicated the 
situation in 2015, however: England reverted to the – at the coarse-grain – north-south divide that 
had characterised its electoral geography in the twentieth century’s middle decades. (Jennings and 
Stoker, 2017, refer to this divide as the continuation of a longer-term trend setting cosmopolitan 
Britain – the big cities and university towns – against the areas where the precariat is relatively large, 
placing the spatial cleavage, as also explored here, as one between types of place rather than 
regions: see also Evans and Menon, 2017, 100ff.) The Conservatives increased their vote share by 
winning over a majority of those who voted for UKIP in 2015: Labour increased its share even more 
by re-mobilising its traditional supporters and engaging a large segment of younger voters with a set 
of post-Brexit left-wing policies. (Young people were generally against Brexit, but their turnout at the 
referendum was lower than that for other age groups, as it was again in 2017.
18
) 
 
The cleavages opened up by the 2016 referendum have not disappeared, however. The split 
between cosmopolitan London and the rest of England remains a major issue challenging the 
Conservative government – which won only 40 of the 158 seats in the three northern regions in 
2017 (plus only 21 of the 73 in London). Claims for greater infrastructural investment outside London 
and for more devolution of powers to regional bodies illustrate the spatial tensions, which may well 
be exacerbated after the UK leaves the EU in 2019 because many parts of those ‘northern regions’ 
that supported Brexit were major beneficiaries from EU investments and depended extensively on 
exporting to EU markets (Dhingra et al., 2017; Los et al., 2017). And those voters who have not 
benefited substantially from the liberal globalisation policies of recent decades, many of whom 
suffered more than average from the post-2007 crash recession and were prepared to vote for UKIP 
in 2014 and 2015 and then Brexit in 2016 (Scotto et al., 2018), were attracted back to Labour in 2017 
                                                            
18
 See G. Skinner and G. Gottfried, ‘How Britain voted in the 2016 referendum’, https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-
mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2016-eu-referendum (accessed 13 February 2018).  
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by a combination of its anti-austerity policies and the Conservative manifesto’s attacks on some 
central welfare state provisions. But if Labour cannot regain power and re-deliver even relative 
prosperity to such groups it may not retain that support for long:
19
 deep economic and cultural 
divides, sustained by suspicion of cosmopolitan politicians, could see increased electoral support for 
parties focused on the demands of the ‘outsiders’ from ‘somewhere’ (Richards, 2017; Goodhart, 
2016) – a new electoral geography might still emerge from the Brexit fallout. Indeed, Sanders (2017) 
has suggested that the previous left-right divide in British politics has been replaced by a division of 
the electorate into four major political tribes – the Liberal Internationalist Pro-EU Left; the Liberal, 
Pro-EU Centre Right; the Authoritarian Populist Centre: and the Authoritarian Populist Right. Labour 
currently has the support of the first of those tribes – which is insufficient alone for it to win power 
in the House of Commons – and the Conservatives have the support of the last two plus much of the 
second tribe. If they lost that latter support, but to a party (or parties) other than Labour a further 
multi-party system could emerge, with a very different geography from that exposed here.  
                                                            
19
 See, for example, the argument for greater attention to ‘the north’ by the Conservative party in A. Gimson 
‘The Conservatives have urgent work in the North of England’ Conservative Home Blog, 24 August 2017, 
https://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2017/08/the-conservatives-have-urgent-work-in-the-
north-of-england.html?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Thursday%2024th%20August%202017&utm_ 
content=Thursday%2024th%20August%202017+CID_0a4d320571c27f73c4eb405ae65b6052&utm_source=Dai
ly%20Email&utm_term=The%20Conservatives%20have%20urgent%20work%20in%20the%20North%20of%20
England (accessed 24 August 2017) 
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Appendix. The Classification of Local Authorities 
 
Supergroup Group Subgroup 
London Cosmopolitan London Cosmopolitan Central Cosmopolitan Inner London 
  Cosmopolitan Heart of London 
 London Cosmopolitan Suburbia Cosmopolitan North London 
  Cosmopolitan South London 
Business and Education Centres Business and Education Centres Business Centres 
  Education Centres 
Coast and Heritage Coastal Resorts Coastal and Rural 
  Resorts and Ports 
 Heritage Centres Heritage Centres 
Countryside Rural Coastal Rural Coastal 
 Rural England Established Rural 
  Rural Hub Towns 
 Rural Hinterland Prospering Rural 
  Traditional Rural 
Mining/Heritage/Manufacturing Manufacturing Expanding Manufacturing 
  Manufacturing Centres 
 Mining Heritage Mining and Manufacturing 
  Mining and Rural 
Prosperous England Prosperous England Prosperous Country 
  Prosperous Home Counties 
  Prosperous Towns 
Suburban Traits Growth Areas and Cities City Periphery 
  Expanding Cities 
 Multicultural Suburbs Multicultural Suburbs 
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Table 1. Principal component direct oblimin-rotated factor loadings: analyses of local authority and 
ward census data. 
 
 Local Authority Ward 
 I II III I II III 
Per cent aged 65+ -0.77 -0.04 0.75 -0.75 -0.25 -0.67 
Per cent Asian 0.76 0.11 -0.61 0.50 0.39 0.51 
Per cent Black 0.86 0.05 -0.50 0.84 0.14 0.27 
Per cent born in post-2001  
   EU accession countries 0.87 0.07 -0.32 0.85 0.08 0.32 
Per cent with no educational 
   qualifications -0.19 0.92 0.25 -0.18 0.88 -0.27 
Per cent households deprived 0.48 0.81 -0.50 0.41 0.91 0.29 
Per cent adult students 0.47 0.02 -0.94 0.26 -0.07 0.92 
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Table 2. Regression model coefficients (with standard errors in brackets) of analyses of the 
percentage voting Leave at the 2016 referendum by local authority (coefficients statistically different 
from zero at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold) 
 
Model 1 2  3 
Intercept 54.5 47.7  40.9 
 (0.3) (1.4)  (1.9) 
 
Factor I -2.2 -0.9  -0.4  
 (0.4) (0.5)  (0.5) 
Factor II 6.0 5.9  5.6 
 (0.3) (0.4)  (0.4) 
Factor III 4.6 4.2  4.0  
 (0.4) (0.4)  (0.5) 
 
Region (comparator London)    Supergroup (comparator London  
    Cosmopolitan) 
Southeast  8.0 Business/Education 13.1 
  (1.4)  (1.9) 
Southwest  5.6 Coast/Heritage 14.4 
  (1.7)  (2.3) 
East of England  8.6 Countryside 14.2 
  (1.6)  (2.3) 
East Midlands  9.4 Mining/Manufacturing 14.7 
  (1.6)  (2.2) 
West Midlands  9.3 Prosperous Places 14.5 
  (1.7)  (2.1) 
Yorkshire/Humber  7.8 Suburban Traits 15.7 
  (1.9)  (1.7) 
Northeast  6.4 
  (2.3) 
Northwest  4.3 
  (1.8) 
 
R
2
 0.68 0.72  0.75 
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Table 3. The largest negative and positive unstandardised residuals from regressions of the 
percentage voting Leave at the 2016 referendum including variables for (a) subregions and (b) 
subgroups 
 
(a) Subregion  (b) Subgroup . 
Brighton & Hove -13.7 Liverpool -18.2 
Hackney -13.5 Knowsley -16.8 
Bristol -9.8 Richmond-upon-Thames -12.0 
Lewes -9.5 Trafford -11.6 
Haringey -9.1 Sefton -10.6 
Hastings -9.1 Bristol -9.9 
Enfield -9.0 Brighton & Hove -9.8 
Leicester -8.7 Stockport -9.7 
St Albans -8.6 Hackney -9.4 
Knowsley -8.4 Wirral -9.0 
Richmond upon Thames -8.3 Enfield -8.9 
Waverley -8.1 Bradford -8.7 
Waltham Forest -8.1 Haringey -7.9 
Adur -7.8 Tunbridge Wells -7.8 
Tunbridge Wells -7.6 Barnet -7.6 
Stockton-on-Tees 6.3 Richmondshire 6.9 
Kensington & Chelsea 6.4 Gosport 7.5 
Runnymede 6.6 Forest Heath 7.7 
Bracknell Forest 6.8 Medway 8.0 
Selby 6.8 Plymouth 8.1 
Richmondshire 6.9 Dartford 8.2 
Gosport 7.5 St Helens 8.5 
Forest Heath  7.7 Rochford 8.6 
Medway 8.0 Portsmouth 8.7 
Plymouth 8.1 Welwyn & Hatfield 8.9 
Dartford 8.2 Bexley 9.7 
St Helens 8.5 Thurrock 10.1 
Rochford 8.6 Havering 11.1 
Portsmouth 8.7 Hillingdon 11.5 
Welwyn & Hatfield 8.9 Newham 17.4 
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Table 4. The largest negative and positive unstandardised residuals from regressions of the 
percentage voting Leave at the 2016 referendum including variables for both subregions and 
subgroups     
     
Richmond-upon-Thames -11.6 Newham 6.0 
Brighton & Hove  -10.9 North Lincolnshire 6.2  
Bristol -10.7 Slough 6.7 
Hackney -9.7 Plymouth 6.7 
Enfield -8.7 Forest Heath 6.9 
Tunbridge Wells -8.5 Havering 7.2 
North Hertfordshire -7.9 Charnwood 7.2 
Hastings -7.7 Richmondshire 7.5 
High Peak -7.5 Portsmouth 7.9 
Norwich -7.4 Thurrock 8.0 
Haringey -7.4 Bournemouth 8.1 
Knowsley -7.3 Runnymede 8.2 
Mendip -7.1 Welwyn & Hatfield 8.9 
Barnet -7.0 St Helens 9.2 
Adur -7.0 Hillingdon 9.2 
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Table 5. Regressions of the percentage voting Leave at the 2016 referendum against each party’s 
share of the votes cast at the 2015 general election, by constituency (standard errors for the 
coefficients are shown in brackets; coefficients statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level or 
better are shown in bold) 
 
 
 Constant Party%2015 London R
2
 
Labour 56.0 (0.9) -0.01 (0.03) -15.4 (1.3) 0.23 
Conservative 55.2 (1.2) 0.01 (0.03) -15.4 (1.2) 0.23 
Liberal Democrat 58.7 (0.6) -0.38 (0.05)  -15.8 (1.2) 0.31 
UKIP 35.6 (0.8)  1.29 (0.05) -6.2 (0.9) 0.66 
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Table 6. Regressions of the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat shares of the votes cast at 
the 2017 general election (standard errors for the coefficients are shown in brackets; coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold). 
 
  
Model 1 2 3 4 
Labour 
Constant 9.5 (0.4) 11.0 (0.6) 11.1 (0.6) 11.2 (0.6)  
Vote%2015 1.02 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 1.02 (0.01)  
UKIP%2015  -0.09 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03) -0.08 (0.05) 
UKIPCand2017   -0.82 (0.38) -0.78 (0.36)  
London    -0.36 (0.57)  
R
2
 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Conservative 
Constant 7.5 (0.7) -3.0 (0.6) -2.4 (0.06) -0.6 (0.6)  
Vote%2015 0.94 (0.02) 0.95 (0.01) 0.95 (0.01) 0.94 (0.01)  
UKIP%2015  0.70 (0.03) 0.73 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03)  
UKIPCand2017   -1.53 (0.33) -1.24 (0.32)  
London    -3.11 (0.49) 
R
2
 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.95 
Liberal Democrat 
Constant -0.5 (0.2) 1.0 (0.5) 1.2 (0.5) 0.4 (0.6) 
Vote%2015 1.00 (0.02) 0.98 (0.02) 0.98 (0.02) 0.99 (0.02) 
UKIP%2015  -0.09 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
UKIPCand2017   -0.58 (0.34) -0.71 (0.34) 
London    1.49 (0.51) 
R
2
 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 
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Figure 1. Regression coefficients for each region, with their upper and lower bounds, with Greater 
London as the comparator 
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Figure 2. Regression coefficients for each subregion, with their upper and lower bounds, with Inner 
London as the comparator 
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Figure 3. Regression coefficients for each group, with their upper and lower bounds, with London 
Cosmopolitan Central as the comparator 
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Figure 4. Regression coefficients for each subgroup, with their upper and lower bounds, with 
Cosmopolitan Inner London as the comparator 
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Figure 5. The average unstandardised ward residuals by local authority 
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Figure 6. The average unstandardised ward absolute residuals by local authority 
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Figure 7. The relationship between Labour’s share of the votes cast at the 2015 general election and 
the percentage voting Leave at the 2016 referendum, by constituency 
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Figure 8. The relationships between the Conservative and Labour party vote shares at the 2015 and 
2017 general elections, by constituency (separately identified by whether a majority voted for Brexit 
at the 2016 referendum) 
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